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Implicit evaluations are often assumed to reflect “unconscious attitudes”. We review data from our lab to 
conclude that the truth of this statement depends on how one defines “unconscious”. A trait definition of 
unconscious according to which implicit evaluations reflect cognitions that are introspectively inaccessible 
at all times appears to be inaccurate. However, when unconscious is defined as a state in which cognitions 
can be in at specific times, some data suggest that the cognitions reflected on implicit evaluations may 
sometimes unfold without direct awareness in that people seem to rarely pay attention to them. Additionally, 
people appear to be miscalibrated in their reports in that they construe even conscious biases in self-serving 
ways. This analysis suggests that implicit evaluations do not reflect unconscious cognitions per se, but 
awareness-independent cognitions that are often preconscious and miscalibrated. Discussion centers on the 
meaning of this analysis for theory and application. 
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In trying to distinguish implicit from 
explicit measures, one of the most prominent 
features has been the idea that implicit 
measures reflect “unconscious” cognitions in 
contrast to explicit measures, which reflect 
“conscious” cognitions (e.g., Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Lai et al., 2013; McConnell et 
al., 2011; Nosek et al., 2002)2. Among other 
things, this idea is often based on the 
observation that implicit and explicit 
measures of the same targets generally show 
low correlations (Hofmann, Gawronski et al., 
2005; Nosek, 2005; Nosek & Hansen, 2008); 
and it has been met with enthusiasm by the 
                                                 
 
1 This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. 
Please do not copy or cite without authors permission. The final article will be available upon publication. Cite as: 
Hahn, A., & Goedderz, A. (in press). Trait-unconsciousness, State-unconsciousness, Preconsciousness, and Social 
Miscalibration in the Context of Implicit Evaluations. Social Cognition. 
Adam Hahn at the University of Bath, the United Kingdon and Alexandra Goedderz, University of Cologne, 
Germany. Correspondence should be addressed to Adam.Hahn@uni-koeln.de 
2 We use the terms “implicit” and “explicit” on the level of measurement outcomes (i.e., “measures”). According 
to this definition, an “implicit evaluation” is an evaluation inferred from indirect computerized measurement 
instruments, whereas an “explicit evaluation” is an evaluation stated in self-report measures (Hahn & Gawonski, 
(2018)). These definitions make no inferences about the underlying cognitions that are reflected on each type of 
measurement outcome. Instead, we use the current paper to weigh the different implications the data have for 
understanding those underlying cognitions. 
public. Different writers have declared the 
existence of “unconscious racisms” (Quillian, 
2008) and “unconscious prejudice” (Powell, 
2016) on the basis of research with implicit 
measures. The idea was challenged by data 
showing that people can predict the patterns 
of their implicit evaluations (Hahn et al., 
2014; Hahn & Gawronski, 2019; Hahn & 
Goedderz, in prep. a, in prep. b). These data 
are in line with dual-process models 
ascertaining that the cognitions reflected on 
implicit measures are often consciously 
rejected for explicit reports, for example, 
because people are “unwilling” to admit to 
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them (ProjectImplicit.net, 2020). Such 
models present these cognitions as conscious, 
but rejected (Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). 
 At the same time, the idea that implicit 
measures reflect fully conscious cognitions 
appears to stand at odds with other 
observations. For instance, people are 
surprised and defensive at IAT feedback 
(Gawronski, 2019; Goedderz & Hahn, in 
prep.; Howell et al., 2013; Howell et al., 
2017; Schlachter & Rolf, 2017), and most 
people seem to think that they are less biased 
than others, a statistically impossible 
perception (Hahn et al., 2014; Howell & 
Ratliff, 2017). Such observations suggest that 
there are things people do not know about the 
cognitions reflected in implicit evaluations, 
and this may justify calling them 
“unconscious”.  
In the present paper, we will review 
evidence for both arguments as they pertain 
specifically to implicit evaluations. In doing 
so, we argue, first, that whether or not the 
cognitions reflected on implicit evaluations 
should be called “unconscious” depends on 
how one defines this term (Norman, 2010). 
Whereas defining a whole class of cognitions 
(e.g., all cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures) as unconscious implies a trait 
definition of unconsciousness, most 
researchers and lay people appear to think of 
unconsciousness as a state of a specific 
cognition that can change. A second problem 
is methodology. Which analyses would 
demonstrate whether a sample of study 
participants is aware or unaware of the 
cognitions showing on implicit measures? 
We argue that introducing a new construct – 
“social calibration” – can help explain 
contradictory findings in this domain. 
                                                 
 
3 Some researchers use the term “awareness” as an attribute for both people and cognitions (e.g., Hütter et al. 
(2012); Hütter and Sweldens (2013)). To address the frequent usage of the term “unconscious attitudes,” we use the 
terms “conscious” and “unconscious” to refer to cognitions in this article. 
Distinguishing between social calibration 
and awareness can demonstrate (1) how 
people who think they are less biased than 
others may harbor a lack of social awareness, 
but still be introspectively aware of their 
biases; and (2) why low between-subjects 
correlations between reports on cognitions 
and implicit measures might be misleading 
when interpreted as evidence for 
unconsciousness.  
Below, we start by explaining each of the 
constructs and definitions in detail, including 
what empirical observations would support 
calling the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures unconscious under each definition 
or construct. We will then present some 
ongoing research from our lab in an attempt 
to answer whether implicit evaluations reflect 
trait-unconscious, state-unconscious, and/or 
frequently miscalibrated cognitions. We 
conclude by discussing the meaning of these 
findings to dual-process models and usage of 
implicit measures in applied contexts. 
Definitions 
We use the terms conscious and 
unconscious as attributes for cognitions, and 
the terms aware and unaware to describe the 
hosts of those cognitions. Hence, a cognition 
of which a person is unaware is unconscious, 
whereas a cognition of which a person is 
aware is conscious.3 Gawronski et al. (2006) 
distinguish between three aspects of an 
automatic cognition of which a person can be 
aware: Its source (i.e., how did the cognition 
develop?), its content (the cognition itself), 
and the impact it has on behavior. Our 
analysis is focused on content. In other words, 
we ask whether people are aware of the 
cognitions reflected on implicit measures. 
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Based on previous work on consciousness, 
we further assume that whether or not a 
cognition reaches conscious awareness 
depends on (1a) the strength of the signal it 
produces, and (1b) the degree of attention that 
is directed towards this signal (Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001; Hahn & Goedderz, in 
prep. b; Hofmann & Wilson, 2010). 
Unconscious Definition 1: Inaccessible to 
Introspection (Trait-unconscious) 
This definition implies that an 
unconscious cognition is impossible to know 
for its host unless this host is informed of its 
existence from another source. For instance, 
it is impossible to observe how the reflections 
of light on the retinae of our eyes initially 
project images that are upside-down, and 
only later transformed into three-dimensional, 
upright images of our environment. We may 
learn about this process from books and 
scientists, but it is impossible to observe it 
unfold directly via introspection. The process 
is trait-unconscious. Regarding the two 
processes introduced in the beginning, a trait-
unconscious cognition refers primarily to 
Process 1a: It produces no detectable signal. 
Regardless how much attention is paid, there 
is nothing a person could observe that would 
allow them to notice the cognition.4 
A trait definition of “unconscious” in the 
term “unconscious attitudes” implies that 
people would be unable to report on the 
contents of the cognitions reflected in 
implicit evaluations without completion of a 
test and feedback about their performance. It 
is prominent in the first half of the popular 
definition of implicit evaluations as “attitudes 
people are unable or unwilling to report” 
(ProjectImplicit.net, 2020), and many authors 
have explicitly made claims about 
                                                 
 
4 Applied to Process 1b, a class of cognitions would be trait-unconscious if no person ever paid attention to the 
signals the cognitions produce, even though such signals exist. We consider this option hypothetical and will not 
discuss it in the present article. 
inaccessibility (e.g., Kassin et al., 2011; 
Kihlstrom, 2004; Nosek, 2005, 2007). It 
stands at odds with dual-process models that 
assert that the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures are consciously rejected when 
people decide what to report on explicit 
measures (Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). These models define 
the cognitions reflected in implicit 
evaluations as trait-conscious. Empirically, 
the trait-unconsciousness assumption is 
challenged by findings that people can 
predict the patterns of their implicit 
evaluations (Hahn et al., 2014; Hahn & 
Gawronski, 2019; Hahn & Goedderz, in 
prep. a). We discuss this research and 
whether implicit measures reflect trait-
unconscious cognitions in Question 1.  
Unconscious Definition 2: Not Residing in 
Awareness at a Specific Point in Time 
(State-Unconscious or Preconscious) 
You may have been in a situation in which 
you noticed for the first time that you disliked 
the smell of a specific food item, and you felt 
that you had been “unaware” of this 
evaluation beforehand. We would argue that 
you were using a state definition of 
awareness in this context; your evaluation 
was “state-unconscious” until you paid 
attention to it. It may be described as a “state” 
definition, because here unconsciousness is a 
state of the cognition that defined it only at a 
specific time (before you thought about it), 
and this state changed as soon as you directed 
your attention to it. State-unconsciousness 
can happen at both Stages 1a and 1b. 
Specifically, moderating conditions may 
influence the strength of a signal a cognition 
produces (Process 1a), such that it remains 
state-unconscious until those conditions are 
in press, Social Cognition 4 
 
present. For instance, you may be truly 
unaware that you dislike a specific smell until 
you are confronted with a concrete instance 
of it. At the same time, you may remain 
unaware of your reaction simply from not 
paying attention even when the smell is 
present (Process 1b). When cognitions are 
known to be accessible when attention is paid, 
but remain unconscious as long as a person 
does not pay attention, they may also be 
called “preconscious” in the pre-attention 
state (Dehaene et al., 2006).  
We have divided our review of the 
evidence of state-unconsciousness and 
preconsciousness into two questions 
mapping onto the two processes. In Question 
2a, we ask whether independent moderators 
can facilitate or inhibit the strength of the 
signal the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures produce. If, holding attention 
constant, certain factors facilitate accurate 
prediction of IAT scores, then this would 
indicate that the cognitions reflected on 
implicit evaluations can be state-unconscious 
when those conditions are absent. Question 
2b asks whether people remain unaware of 
their biases until they are asked to pay 
attention to them. A negation of this question 
(people do not pay attention until asked) 
would imply that the cognitions reflected in 
implicit measures are preconscious for many 
people a lot of the time.  
Note that these points would not justify 
calling the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures unconscious per se. Instead, they 
would suggest that the cognitions reflected 
on implicit evaluations are independent of 
awareness, such that they can variably unfold 
in a conscious, preconscious, or unconscious 
state. 
Social Calibration 
Social calibration describes how 
consistently different people use the same 
labels to describe the same cognitions. To 
understand the concept of social calibration, 
imagine you are asked to predict how you 
would score on a racial bias IAT. Now 
imagine further you had to rate how strong 
exactly your bias is. Are you going to show a 
“slightly more positive reaction” towards one 
group than another, or a “strongly more 
positive reaction”? To be able to answer this 
question, you would have to know (1) how 
other people perceive “slight” or “strong” 
biases, and (2) be able and willing to apply 
this standard to your own cognitions (Hahn & 
Goedderz, in prep. b). The difference 
between knowing you are biased and 
knowing what to call your bias in comparison 
with others is what we refer to when we 
distinguish social calibration from 
introspective awareness (Hahn & Goedderz, 
in prep. b). Introspective awareness describes 
whether or not a person is aware of a 
cognition, whereas social calibration 
describes whether they are aware of where 
this cognition lies in comparison to a 
reference sample. 
Social calibration matters in discussions 
around awareness for at least two reasons. 
First, it can explain why people may have 
unrealistic beliefs that they are less biased 
than others, even though they are aware of 
being biased per se. If a person believes that 
they are less biased than other people 
perceive them to be, this can be indicative of 
a lack of social awareness – similar to 
overlooking one’s impoliteness or lack of 
kindness as it is perceived by others. As we 
will show, however, it is different from 
failing to notice a cognitive process 
introspectively. Second, awareness and 
calibration are systematically confounded in 
between-subjects correlations between 
reports of a cognition (e.g., prediction of an 
IAT score) and criteria for the same cognition 
(e.g., actual IAT scores), an issue to which we 
turn next. We discuss empirical evidence on 
whether people are socially calibrated in their 
attitude reports in Question 3. 
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Distinguishing introspective awareness 
from social calibration methodologically.  
Most research on awareness infers its 
presence or absence from between-subjects 
correlations (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2009, 
2005; Howell et al., 2013). For instance, 
Howell et al. (2013) found a non-significant 
correlation of .12 between IAT score 
predictions and actual scores on a Black-
White IAT. Most participants expected to 
show lower biases (e.g., a “slight 
preference”) than their feedback indicated 
(e.g., a “strong preference”). Importantly, for 
between-subjects correlations between 
predicted and actual IAT scores to be high, 
participants have to agree on how bias scores 
are labeled. The most biased person in a 
sample would have to agree to use the end of 
a scale, and the person with the weakest 
biases would have to agree that their biases 
should be labeled towards the center of the 
scale, close to “no bias”. They would have to 
be socially calibrated.5 While it is true that 
the participants in Howell et al.’s (2013) 
study may have been unaware of their biases, 
a between-subjects analysis simply doesn’t 
allow researchers to distinguish between 
awareness and calibration. 
To assess only introspective awareness, 
analyses have to be conducted within-
subjects across targets. For within-subjects 
correlations to be high, participants in a 
sample would have to be able to say whether 
or not their individual biases towards, e.g., 
Latinos is stronger than their biases towards 
Asians, and different again from their biases 
towards other social groups. The patterns 
they describe should map onto the patterns of 
scores they show, independent of whether 
                                                 
 
5 This is especially true for homogenous samples, such as White undergraduates from the same university, 
who can be expected to show similar levels of bias against certain groups (Payne et al. , 2017). More diverse 
samples could show higher between-subjects correlations simply from distinguishing people who are biased in favor 
of one group from people who are biased in favor the other group, even if the participants disagree on how to label 
those biases. 
they believe all of those biases are milder or 
stronger than the biases of others.  
In summation, within-subjects 
correlations per participants across targets 
can demonstrate introspective awareness, 
whereas between-subjects correlations per 
target across participants speak to how well-
calibrated participants are in their reports on 
responses to individual target groups. 
Questions Pertaining to Awareness and 
Calibration in Implicit Measures 
Question 1: Are the Cognitions Reflected 
in Implicit Evaluations Trait-unconscious 
(i.e., Inaccessible to Conscious 
Introspection)? 
Before Hahn et al. (2014), most research 
on awareness had looked at between-subjects 
correlations between implicit and traditional 
explicit evaluations of the same targets (e.g., 
Hofmann et al., 2009, 2005; Nosek, 2005, 
2007). A traditional explicit attitude question 
can range from “how warmly do you feel 
towards group X” to the Modern Racism 
Scale (McConahay, 1986, used to dissociate 
implicit and explicit evaluations, e.g., by Nier, 
2005). Such between-subjects implicit-
explicit correlations tend to be low. (e.g., r 
= .2 in a meta-analysis by Hofmann, 
Gawronski et al., 2005), and this was 
interpreted such that awareness of the 
cognitions reflected on implicit measures 
must also be low (Nosek, 2005; Nosek & 
Hansen, 2008). Importantly, however, a 
variety of dual-process models explain 
relations between implicit and explicit 
evaluations differently (Devine, 1989; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & 
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McConnell, 2006). For instance, according to 
both the Associative-Propositional 
Evaluations Model (APE, Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006) and the Motivation and 
Opportunity as Determinants Model (MODE, 
Fazio, 2007), implicit evaluations reflect 
associations between an attitude target and 
valence. The models further assume that 
these associations are often rejected or 
overridden when people are asked for an 
explicit evaluation. According to the MODE 
model, explicit evaluations will differ when a 
person is motivated and has the opportunity 
to override the initial response implied by an 
association. According to the APE model, 
implicit evaluations are rejected when the 
person considers other information that has 
opposing evaluative implications more valid. 
For instance, a White American who is asked 
to evaluate African Americans might think of 
their Black friends and colleagues, other 
admired Black exemplars, and/or their 
egalitarian values. Even if the person harbors 
negative associations with African 
Americans as a category, they may reject 
these associations for their report in favor of 
this other, more positive, information. 
According to these models, implicit-explicit 
correlations can show whether people 
consider the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures valid for judgment, not whether 
they are aware of them. 
Integrating these thoughts, Hahn et al. 
(2014) asked participants to predict how they 
would score on five upcoming IATs. Table 1 
shows results averaged from two national 
contexts. Prediction accuracy was calculated 
within-subjects across five predictions and 
five IATs. It was always high, even as explicit 
measures showed lower correlations with the 
same IAT scores. The authors additionally 
looked at how much of their own pattern each 
person could predict over and above a 
random other participant (and hence beyond 
a normative pattern). Analyses supported the 
notion that people have unique insight into 
the patterns of their own scores. Relations 
between implicit and explicit evaluations of 
the same targets could furthermore be 
explained entirely by IAT score predictions 
(see Table 1). These studies support the APE 
and MODE models’ notions that people can 
be aware of the cognitions reflected on 
implicit measures, but may often reject them 
as bases for explicit reports. In sum, 
according to our data the answer to Question 
1 is no – the cognitions reflected in implicit 
evaluations are not inaccessible, they are not 
trait-unconscious. 
Question 2a: Do the Cognitions Reflected 
on Implicit Measures Remain (State-) 
Unconscious Until Specific Conditions Are 
Met? 
In an ongoing project, Hahn and Goedderz 
(in prep. a) tested whether seeing concrete 
stimuli or knowledge of measurement had the 
bigger influence on prediction accuracy. In 
these studies, attention to spontaneous 
reactions (Process 1b) was held constant 
(participants were always asked to report on 
their spontaneous reactions to social groups), 
while two other factors in the prediction 
procedure were manipulated. Results favor 
concrete stimuli over knowledge of 
measurement as a determining factor. 
Participants who predicted their reactions to 
a hypothetical test, or simply reported their 
spontaneous reactions without 
announcement of a test, did not differ 
significantly from participants who were told 
that their reactions would be tested later. 
However, participants were less accurate 
without pictures. A follow-up study further 
showed that predictions were still more 
accurate when participants saw different 
pictures of the groups than those that would 
be used on the IATs. This latter finding 
suggests that the effect cannot be explained 
as a stimulus effect alone. That is, 
participants should always be more accurate 
when using the exact same stimuli for the 
in press, Social Cognition 7 
 
predictions due to stimulus-specific reactions, 
and the data supported this notion. However, 
the fact that participants tended to be better 
with other concrete pictures as well means 
that it must be something about the 
concreteness of the stimuli, and not just the 
specific stimuli themselves, that is 
responsible for the effect. One interpretation 
of these findings is that people may continue 
to recruit different propositional information 
(e.g., specific exemplars, values) when they 
predict a reaction in the abstract than when 
they predict it while looking at concrete 
stimuli. This interpretation is supported by 
the observation that participants’ predictions 
were more strongly related to their explicit 
evaluations without pictures than with 
pictures (Hahn & Goedderz, in prep. a).  
The idea that people need concrete stimuli 
to discover their biases is also supported by 
findings that people were less surprised at 
IAT scores when they first observed their 
reactions towards pictures, while making an 
abstract IAT score prediction without pictures 
did not reduce surprise (Goedderz & Hahn, in 
prep.). More research is needed to determine 
whether, and if so, which, moderating factors 
facilitate IAT score prediction accuracy when 
attention to spontaneous reactions is held 
constant. As it stands, the abstractness 
interpretation of the findings presented here 
suggests that the biases reflected on implicit 
measures may often be state-unconscious 
until people are confronted with concrete 
stimuli that trigger affective responses.  
Question 2b: Do the Cognitions Reflected 
on Implicit Measures Remain 
Preconscious until People are Specifically 
Encouraged to Pay Attention to Them? 
To answer this question, Hahn and 
Gawronski (2019) looked at changes on 
explicit measures after IAT score prediction. 
If people change their explicit evaluations, 
then this would suggest that they discover 
new information they had not considered 
previously. However, if people are always 
aware of their biases and consciously reject 
them as bases for explicit judgments, then 
those explicit judgments should not change in 
reaction to predicting IAT scores. Confirming 
the first hypothesis, results showed that the 
simple act of observing one’s reactions and 
then predicting how one would score on IATs 
led to changes on explicit evaluations. 
Completing IATs – explained as a measure of 
implicit racial attitudes – had no effect by 
itself. This latter effect disconfirms a social-
desirability explanation according to which 
participants simply gave up their covers and 
became “more honest” once they knew their 
biases would be assessed. If this were the 
case, IAT completion should have had the 
same effect as IAT score prediction. Later 
studies in the same article found that, even 
without reference to the existence of a test, 
encouragement to observe their reactions led 
participants to describe themselves as more 
biased.  
Additional evidence comes from 
Goedderz and Hahn (in prep.). First, these 
studies confirmed the so-far anecdotal 
observation that people are more surprised 
when their IAT scores indicate bias than 
when they do not. However, here too, a 
simple encouragement to observe one’s 
reactions to pictures of Black and White 
people reduced surprise at bias feedback on a 
Black-White IAT.  
These studies suggest that people do not 
always consider the cognitions reflected in 
implicit evaluations and deliberately reject 
them. Instead, people seem to discover new 
information when they are asked to observe 
their own affective reactions towards 
concrete stimuli. IATs include concrete 
stimuli but no encouragement to pay 
attention to one’s reactions. Accordingly, the 
fact that IAT completion alone leads people 
to react to feedback with surprise (Goedderz 
& Hahn, in prep.), defensive responses 
(Howell & Ratliff, 2017), as well as to 
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unchanged explicit evaluations and 
unchanged acknowledgment of bias 
compared to control (Hahn & Gawronski, 
2019), supports the notion that the biases 
reflected on implicit measures are often 
preconscious until specific encouragement to 
pay attention.  
Question 3: Are People Socially Calibrated 
When Reporting on the Cognitions 
Reflected on Implicit Evaluations? 
To assess introspective awareness 
independent of social calibration, Hahn et al. 
(2014; see also Hahn & Gawronski, 2019; 
Hahn & Goedderz, in prep. b) calculated 
prediction accuracy within-subjects. 
Relevant for the current question, the same 
data can be used to look at how well-
calibrated participants are by calculating 
between-subjects correlations between 
predictions and IAT scores for each attitude 
target pair. Between-subjects correlations 
between predictions and IAT scores for 
social-group biases were on average .31 
across four studies on US-American 
undergraduates in Hahn et al. (2014), and .21 
in Hahn and Goedderz (in prep. b) on 
German student participants. Additionally, 
Hahn et al. (2014) found that most 
participants thought that other participants in 
the same study would show more bias than 
they would show themselves, a statistically 
impossible result. Hence, participants in 
these studies seemed to be socially 
miscalibrated, even though they otherwise 
showed awareness. 
One may argue that all calibration is 
arbitrary and there are no consensual cultural 
standards from which a person could learn to 
be better calibrated. Research on anchoring 
and adjustment has shown that people’s 
judgments are often anchored upon arbitrary, 
situationally accessible information (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). For instance, numerical 
judgments, even in domains as important as 
legal decisions, can be influenced by anchors 
as arbitrary as a role of a die (Englich et al., 
2006). Contradictory to this perspective is the 
observation that humans talk about their 
preferences (for food, music, clothes) all the 
time. Both researchers and lay people appear 
to assume that liking something “very much” 
is different from liking something only “a 
little bit.” And indeed, the non-zero between-
subjects correlations reported above suggest 
that people are somewhat calibrated to assess 
whether their biases are mild or strong 
compared to one another, albeit to a very 
limited degree. 
To test whether people might be better 
calibrated in domains where it is both more 
common to communicate one’s preferences 
and less socially threatening to voice strong 
preferences than in the domain of social 
groups, Hahn and Goedderz (in prep. b) 
asked participants to predict their scores on 
five IATs towards baked goods. Participants 
were better calibrated in the domain of baked 
goods (average r = .39) than in the domain of 
social groups (average r = .21), despite 
similar introspective awareness (corrected r’s 
= .55 and .63 for baked goods and social 
groups, respectively). Additional analyses 
showed that most participants used only the 
mildest labels available on the 7-point scales 
when predicting their IAT scores in the 
domain of social groups (most participants 
describe their biases as “slight”, Anchors 3 
and 5 on the 7-point scales, regardless of 
strength). In contrast, predictions in the 
domain of baked goods encompassed the full 
scale, frequently including “a lot more 
positive” reactions (Anchors 1 and 7) 
towards some categories of baked goods than 
others. In fact, participants predicted the 
same IAT scores with significantly stronger 
labels when they measured implicit 
evaluations of baked goods than when they 
measured implicit evaluations of social 
groups. These findings suggest that 
participants are less well calibrated when the 
available anchors sound socially undesirable. 
in press, Social Cognition 9 
 
We return to the factors that influence 
calibration below. As it stands, the available 
data suggest that people tend to be 
miscalibrated in their biases towards social 
groups, but that social calibration varies 
widely as a function of domain, although it 
might never be perfect.  
Discussion 
Our analyses suggest that the cognitions 
reflected on implicit measures should not be 
called “unconscious” when this term is used 
as a trait that defines them at all time. The 
available data suggest that it is possible to be 
aware of them. However, our analyses also 
suggest that those cognitions might 
sometimes be state-unconscious when people 
are asked to simulate their biases in the 
abstract rather than in a concrete encounter; 
and preconscious until a person pays specific 
attention to their spontaneous reactions in 
such concrete encounters.  
The description “unconscious attitudes” 
implies a trait definition that describes the 
cognitions reflected on implicit measures as 
unconscious at all times. In contrast, 
assuming that people are generally 
“unwilling” to report on those cognitions 
implies a definition of those cognitions as 
trait-conscious. Our findings support neither 
of these definitions. Instead, they suggest that 
the cognitions reflected on implicit measures 
may be defined as awareness-independent. 
They can variably be (state-) conscious, 
(state-) unconscious, or preconscious at 
different times. This differentiates implicit 
from explicit measures, which presumably 
always reflect conscious cognitions. 
Lastly, our review of the evidence 
suggests that people are often miscalibrated 
in reporting the cognitions reflected on 
implicit measures in socially sensitive 
domains. Hence, they may be socially 
unaware of where their biases fall compared 
to others; and they may look unaware of 
socially undesirable biases when awareness 
is determined from between-subjects 
analyses. 
State-Unawareness of Everyday Biases? 
The findings indicating that people might 
often be state-unaware of their social-group 
biases are puzzling in many ways. 
Participants in the studies reported here can 
be assumed to have met people with different 
backgrounds throughout their lives. Why, 
then, do they appear to need concrete stimuli 
to notice their biases? And why do they seem 
to discover new information when they are 
asked to pay attention to their spontaneous 
biases? Could they not just remember their 
reactions in previous situations? We have 
several ideas for possible answers, all of 
which require further research. First, in line 
with Process 1b of our process model, people 
may simply never pay attention to their 
reactions in these domains, such that those 
cognitions remain preconscious in all 
concrete encounters, and cannot be recalled 
later. This interpretation is consistent with 
our findings that, without an attention 
manipulation, people remain surprised at bias 
feedback when they complete IATs, even 
though concrete stimuli are present 
throughout the entire test (Goedderz & Hahn, 
in prep.). Second, people may recognize their 
reactions, but either fail to integrate them into 
long-term memory, or attribute them to other 
sources than the background of the targets. 
These possibilities are consistent with 
observations that people often notice their 
different reactions in the different blocks of 
the IAT, but attribute them to procedural 
details of the test other than racial bias (e.g., 
the block order of the test, Monteith et al., 
2001). One interpretation of these 
possibilities is that people ignore their 
affective reactions to specific social 
categories because those are at odds with 
their values, akin to the concepts of 
repression or suppression (Krickel, 2018; 
Wilson et al., 2000). A third possibility is that 
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there might be further moderating factors that 
increase the strength of the affective reaction 
(Process 1a) that are present in the research 
presented here, but not in real-world 
encounters or during IAT completion. For 
instance, in our studies, predictions are made 
by putting two categories in contrast (e.g., “is 
your reaction more positive towards BLACK 
or more positive towards WHITE?”). In the 
real world, people often meet outgroup 
members individually, but contrast might be 
necessary to notice one’s biased reactions. 
The current data are compatible with all five 
of those processes at the same or different 
times. Future research is needed to explain 
why people appear to find new information 
when they discover their social-group biases. 
Social Calibration and Social Desirability 
Our findings on calibration may be 
described as a problem of socially desirable 
responding (SDR, Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960). However, we think reducing 
calibration to SDR would cloud two 
important components of the calibration 
process. First, SDR is often used to imply that 
participants know the “true” answer to a 
question and hide this answer deliberately 
and dishonestly (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). 
Because participants in Hahn et al’s (2014) 
studies know their biases will be revealed, 
dishonest reporting would be futile. Hence, 
participants likely honestly chose to describe 
their biases with labels they considered 
appropriate. In other words, social calibration 
more likely reflects a lack of social awareness 
than deliberate dishonesty. Although SDR 
may be interpreted in broad ways to include 
such an interpretation, social calibration is a 
more precise description that shows that even 
fully conscious cognitions can be construed 
in self-serving ways. 
The second reason is that other 
motivations than SDR likely influence the 
calibration process. Imagine an egalitarian 
person who believes that the concept of 
implicit bias is not appreciated enough in 
society. This person may show a bias that 
may be termed “slight” by others, but insist 
on calling this bias “strong” because of their 
belief that implicit biases are more 
meaningful than many people assume. In this 
example, the person’s motivation would lead 
them to choose the less socially desirable 
response, but they would nevertheless be 
miscalibrated if their biases would be labeled 
mild by others. Social calibration 
encompasses all processes and motivations 
that lead people to map an answer they want 
to report onto a scale, or into any linguistic 
format. In fact, the low between-subjects 
correlations in the data by Hahn and 
Goedderz (in prep. b) and Hahn et al. (2014) 
show miscalibration in both directions, even 
if they show a tendency to report low levels 
of social biases overall. We believe that this 
emphasis on scale usage makes social 
calibration both more precise (in that it goes 
beyond dishonest responding) and more 
broad (in that it includes motivations beyond 
SDR) than the concept of SDR. 
Notwithstanding these thoughts, our findings 
suggest that people are generally motivated 
to calibrate their responses in socially 
desirable ways in the domain of social groups. 
More research is needed to determine 
whether our new construct will prove useful 
in describing reports on automatic cognitions. 
What Exactly Are People Introspecting 
Upon When They Predict Their IAT 
Results? 
We will attempt to answer this question in 
two ways: methodologically and 
conceptually. Methodologically, much 
research has shown that implicit evaluations 
result from a multitude of processes, many of 
them unique to the method that is used 
(Conrey et al., 2005; Klauer et al., 2007; 
Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Testing the 
contribution of method-specific variance to 
accuracy in IAT score predictions 
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experimentally, Hahn et al. (2014) found that 
predictions were if anything non-
significantly most accurate when participants 
had received no explanation on how the IAT 
works and had no experience with it. These 
results make it unlikely that participants 
predicted method-specific variance. On the 
other hand, participants were more accurate 
in predicting their IAT scores when they saw 
precisely the same stimuli as used on the IAT 
in their predictions, indicating at least some 
degree of stimulus variance (Hahn & 
Goedderz, in prep. a). Recall, however, that 
other concrete stimuli already led to better 
predictions, such that the stimulus effect 
explains only part of the results. Together, 
these findings suggest that people can predict 
variance in their IAT scores beyond its 
specific methodology and hence must have 
some access to the underlying cognitions 
producing those results. But what exactly are 
these underlying cognitions? 
Rivers and Hahn (2019) used the 
quadruple process model (Conrey et al., 
2005) to determine which of five processes 
contributing to IAT responses was most 
strongly related to IAT score predictions in 
Hahn et al.’s (2014) data. Predictions were 
best explained by a combination of the 
difference in associations with one target 
group as opposed to the other (e.g., positive-
White + negative-Black associations) in 
combination with control processes. These 
results suggest that the cognitions 
participants predict may be seen as a 
summary construct, rather than just one 
specific component.  
Conceptually, our working model assumes 
that people can gain awareness of automatic 
cognitions by introspecting upon the 
phenomenological output these cognitions 
produce (Hahn & Goedderz, in prep. b; 
Hofmann & Wilson, 2010). Based on 
research showing that implicit and explicit 
evaluations are more strongly related when 
participants rely on affect for their explicit 
reports (e.g., Ranganath et al., 2008; for a 
meta-analysis, see Hofmann, Gawronski et 
al., 2005), we postulated that the cognitions 
reflected on implicit evaluations manifest 
themselves in spontaneous affective 
reactions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Hahn et al., 2014; Hahn & Gawronski, 2019). 
And indeed, when Hahn and Goedderz (in 
prep. a) asked participants to report just their 
spontaneous “gut responses” without 
mention of a test, those scores showed 
relationships with IAT scores that were 
similar to IAT score predictions.  
Does this mean that participants can 
observe the cognitions reflected in IAT scores 
directly or does it mean that they infer them 
from their “gut reactions”? This question is 
difficult to answer because there is a lack of 
consensus for how the spontaneously 
activated cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures are best conceptualized. While 
most traditional models refer to the 
underlying construct of interest as an 
association (Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995) or a combination of activated 
associations and control (Conrey et al., 2005; 
Payne, 2005), De Houwer (2014) has argued 
that the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures should be described as 
automatically activated propositions. This 
conceptual disagreement makes it difficult to 
say whether observing a “gut reaction” 
means observing or inferring the underlying 
cognition. To us, it sounds equally plausible 
to propose that the gut reaction is the 
underlying cognition (and one may then 
discuss how to conceptualize a gut reaction 
scientifically), as it would be to propose that 
the underlying cognition is something else 
that produces a gut response. We hope that 
continuous advancement in theorizing will 
shed further light on this question. 
In sum, our review of the available data 
suggests that people rely on spontaneous “gut 
responses” when they predict implicit 
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evaluations, beyond method-specific 
variance of the measurement instruments. 
They further suggest that those reactions can 
be dissociated into multiple cognitive 
processes (e.g., the contrast between two 
associations + impulses to control these 
associations). More research and theorizing 
are needed to refine what aspects of the mind 
specifically people can or cannot directly 
observe. 
Awareness and Attitude Process Models 
Many dual-process models declare either 
that (1) the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures are “unconscious” (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Nosek & Hansen, 2008), or that 
(2) people deliberately reject these cognitions 
for explicit reports (e.g., Fazio, 2007; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; for a 
historical analyses of these differences, see 
Payne & Gawronski, 2010). While the former 
models assume that implicit measures reflect 
trait-unconscious cognitions, the latter 
assume those cognitions are trait-conscious, 
but often rejected. In contrast to such 
assumptions, our analyses suggest that the 
cognitions reflected in IAT scores are 
generally accessible, but often remain at least 
preconscious until people pay attention to 
their spontaneous reactions under specific 
circumstances. They are neither trait-
unconscious nor trait-conscious. Hence, both 
types of dual-process models would require 
extensions to accommodate them.  
The idea that implicit measures reflect 
unconscious attitudes per se, or 
“introspectively unidentified … traces of past 
experience” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, 
p. 8) is incompatible with our finding that 
people can predict the patterns of their IAT 
scores. However, our data are compatible 
with the notion that people are often unaware 
of their biases both when they report explicit 
evaluations and when they complete tests that 
provide implicit measures (Goedderz & Hahn, 
in prep.). Despite this compatible aspect, the 
fact that people are generally able to report on 
the valence reflected on implicit measures 
contradicts the notion of two fundamentally 
distinct systems of evaluation.  
Concerning the APE model, our data are 
compatible with the assertion that an explicit 
report is formed from the evaluative 
information that is salient during responding 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). When 
participants were encouraged to pay attention 
to their spontaneous affective reactions, those 
reactions were significantly more strongly 
reflected in their explicit reports; and 
implicit-explicit correlations generally vary 
across participants (Hahn et al., 2014). 
However, our data also suggest that people do 
not always consider the cognitions reflected 
on implicit measures; and when they are 
encouraged to consider them, they appear to 
be finding new information. The APE model 
may accommodate these findings if the term 
“reject” is broadened to encompass a lack of 
consideration rather than a deliberate, 
conscious rejection. Our data are also 
compatible with single-system models that 
assume that an explicit evaluation is formed 
via an iterative process where different 
information is considered and re-considered 
until a person decides on one evaluation to 
report (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2007).  
In sum, our data are hard to reconcile with 
dual-systems accounts that declare the 
cognitions on implicit measures to be 
“unconscious” separate structures 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). They are more 
compatible with either interacting dual-
process or single-process models. However, 
many of these models may require 
specifications concerning how often the 
cognitions reflected on implicit measures 
factor into the process of stating an explicit 
evaluation, instead of assuming they are 
always considered, but then rejected.  
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How Useful Are Implicit Measures? 
One may wonder whether our findings 
suggest that implicit measures are 
superfluous. After all, one could just ask 
participants about their spontaneous 
reactions instead of their deliberately 
endorsed attitudes to get the same 
information that implicit measures reveal. We 
believe such an interpretation would be 
premature for at least three reasons.  
First, the within-subjects correlations 
of .50-.70 are high, but not perfect. 
Additionally, accuracy varies between 
participants, and research with other attitude 
targets might show different values. Although 
our results contradict the notion that implicit 
measures capture consciously inaccessible 
cognitions per se, they could still be 
capturing variance that is not revealed in self-
report measures for all participants and all 
targets. Second, recall that once 
“unconscious” is defined as a state rather than 
a trait of cognitions, the cognitions reflected 
on implicit measures appear to remain 
preconscious until a person is asked to pay 
attention to their spontaneous reactions under 
specific circumstances (e.g., concrete stimuli 
shown in contrast). Lastly, even if those 
circumstances are present, people tend to be 
miscalibrated in their responses. Reports on 
spontaneous reactions cannot indicate who is 
more biased than who when everyone thinks 
they are less biased than everyone else (Hahn 
et al., 2014), but this variance is necessary to 
assess whether spontaneous biases predict 
behavior (Kurdi et al., 2019). Implicit 
measures rank people’s reactions in ways that 
they themselves may be unable or unwilling 
to do.  
In sum, we believe our analyses so far 
contradict the notion that a simple question 
about spontaneous reactions could replace 
implicit measures. Implicit measures can 
reveal information people are temporarily not 
accessing when asked, or unwilling to report 
for other reasons, and they rank those 
cognitions in ways that people may be unable 
to do themselves. 
Practical Implications 
We also believe that the data presented 
here have implications for bias interventions. 
Assuming that biases are unconscious 
implies teaching people about them, e.g., 
with feedback. Assuming that people are 
unwilling to report on their biases implies 
making people admit to something they 
already know. In contrast to both of those 
ideas, our data on how biases are accessible 
but often preconscious suggest that people 
should be encouraged to pay attention to their 
reactions to concrete stimuli. And indeed, in 
a series of studies Hahn and Gawronski 
(2019) showed that encouraging people to 
pay attention to their biases was more 
effective in raising acknowledgment of bias 
than completing IATs. Similarly, our findings 
that people are often miscalibrated and 
motivated to construe their biases as weaker 
than the biases of others (Hahn et al., 2014) 
suggest that interventions may target not only 
awareness of bias, but comparative social 
meaning of biases as well. As described 
above, however, neither of these conclusions 
would be possible if one follows a standard 
definition of implicit measures reflecting 
“attitudes people are unable or unwilling to 
report” (e.g., ProjectImplicit.net, 2020). 
Hence, we believe a more nuanced 
understanding of awareness and implicit 
measures is not only valuable for theory, but 
also paramount for the application of implicit 
measures to societal questions. 
Limitations 
The analyses presented here are based on 
a limited set of studies from our lab run on 
similar paradigms with evaluative IATs on 
social groups. We initially chose the IAT 
because it is the most widely used 
measurement instrument, because it shows 
acceptable psychometric properties 
in press, Social Cognition 14 
 
(Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014), and later 
because we wanted to systematically vary 
one aspect at a time from the original 
paradigm. Future research with different 
measures and attitude targets is needed to 
further validate and refine the ideas presented 
here. Additionally, our data are limited to 
implicit evaluations, which we assume 
manifest themselves in spontaneous affective 
reactions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
This poses the question of whether people 
would be similarly able to predict less affect-
based implicit measures, such as implicit 
stereotypes. We hope that the distinction 
between unconscious, awareness-
independent, and miscalibrated cognitions 
we have deduced from our research will be a 
useful framework to conduct additional 
research, and develop and refine our ideas. 
Conclusion 
The cognitions reflected on implicit 
evaluations are often referred to as 
“unconscious” attitudes. Our analysis 
suggests that this is an incorrect 
characterization when the term “unconscious” 
is used as a trait that describes those 
cognitions at all times. However, when 
“unconscious” is defined as a state in which 
cognitions can be at specific points in time, 
then our data are compatible with the notion 
that the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures can be unconscious. First, people 
often do not pay attention to their biased 
reactions towards social groups, such that 
they may often unfold preconsciously. 
Second, it might be more difficult to observe 
one’s reactions under some conditions (e.g., 
in the abstract) than others (e.g., with 
concrete stimuli), suggesting that conscious 
access is sometimes inhibited. Additionally, 
people may be unwilling or unable to 
calibrate their biases consistently with social 
norms, such that even when people observe 
their biases they draw unrealistic conclusions 
that their reactions are more acceptable than 
the reactions of others. Together, these results 
suggest that people are sometimes not aware 
of the cognitions reflected on implicit 
measures, and that there are specific aspects 
they do not know (i.e., their comparative 
social standing). Future research is needed to 
validate whether these ideas will hold up to 
empirical scrutiny with other measures and 
targets in other domains. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Within-subjects Correlations of IAT Scores With IAT Score Predictions and Traditional Explicit 
Evaluations (Thermometer Ratings) in Different National Contexts 
 
 IAT Score Predictions  
Explicit 
Evaluations 










United States (Hahn et al., 2014), 
All Studies, N = 430 .55 .68 .67 .56  .20 -.03 
Germany (Hahn & Goedderz, in 
prep. b), combined sample from 
other papers, N = 359 
.52 .65 .63 .48  .36 .09 
Note. The predicted IATs included a Black-White IAT, a Latino-White IAT, an Asian-White IAT, 
a celebrity-regular IAT, and an adult-child IAT. Explicit evaluations were thermometer ratings of 
Whites, Black people, Latinos, Asians, celebrities, regular people (non-celebrity), children, and 
adults, ranging from 0 – “cold and unfavorable feelings” to 100 – “very warm and favorable 
feelings”, collapsed into differences scores matching the IATs. Predictions were made on 7-point 
scales and included the pictures and group labels used on the IATs. The specific questions and 
explanations in the predictions were varied in Hahn et al. (2014), but these variations produced 
no meaningful differences. All correlations are significant at p < .001, except explicit evaluations 
predicting IAT scores controlling for predictions in the US samples (upper right-most 
correlation). 
 
1 To account for the skew in the distribution of correlations, corrected averages are calculated by 
Fisher z-transforming all correlations, computing their average, and back-transforming this 
average into a correlation. The corrected averages for Hahn et al. (2014) were calculated for the 
present paper and is not reported in the original paper. The distribution of correlations between 
explicit measures and IAT scores were not significantly skewed such that no transformation is 
reported. 
